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1. INTRODUCTION 
Employing a great majority of citizens living in the developing world, small and
medium sized enterprises (SME) are a key engine of poverty reduction and econom-
ic growth. For millions of communities still struggling to develop, SME are often the
only source of income and economic activity. These small firms provide far more
stable employment and growth than their large and often foreign owned counter-
parts, providing a source of insulation from the turmoil of a country’s transition and
development. The importance of SME is particularly evident in Hungary, where the
sector accounts for 99.8% of all enterprises and employs nearly three-quarters of the
population.
If SME are the engine of Hungary’s future economic growth, then state of the art
technology and the ability to access finance are necessary to fuel this potential.
Financial services, ranging from simple bank loans to more complex factoring and
leasing mechanisms, allow small entrepreneurs to finance high return investment
projects, to pursue costly yet critical research and development activities and ulti-
mately, to expand their businesses. An abundant supply of financial services ensures
that sufficient credit is available for the entry of new firms with innovative and
growth inducing products and the purchase of the newest technologies to remain
competitive. 
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Totaling EUR 29 billion, Hungary is in the midst of implementing its largest
economic development program in its young democratic history. At the center
of the European Union led development program is an effort to revitalize and
reequip Hungary’s languishing small and medium sized enterprises (SME),
long the country's heart of employment. This paper examines the efficiency
and impact of two Structural Fund's instruments to enhance SME development
– ECOP 2.1.1 and JEREMIE. A survey of 1275 SME and interviews with dozens
of top policy-makers paint a flawed development program in dire need of
reform. Despite this, empirical analysis suggests JEREMIE funds may have
dampened the effects of the financial crisis and are crucial for the continued
liquidity of SME, who have been particularly hit hard by the world financial
crisis.
Given this potential, the European Union and the Hungarian government have
thus placed SME near the top of the ambitious Structural Funds development pro-
gram. Among the many mechanisms established to support the development of
Hungarian SME, individual programs to enhance technological development and
access to finance are at the core of the government’s SME strategy. Within the
Economic Operation Program (ECOP) of the initial 2004–2006 programming peri-
od, priority access 2.1 was established to support the technological development of
SME. The main objective of priority access 2.1.1, was to “increase competitiveness,
to improve SME market positions, to modernise the SME's technological and infra-
structural capability and increase their capacity for innovation.”1
In light of Hungary's chronic financial constraints, the Hungarian government
earmarked HUF 200 billion, or USD 1.02 billion for a New Hungary Enterprise Pro-
motion Program in 2007. Nearly a billion of the USD 34 billion allocated to Hungary
in the 2007–2013 EU Structural Fund programming period were channeled into
JEREMIE, an initiative to “enhance SME finance” JEREMIE works to integrate various
credit mechanisms into one development program, and provides low cost loans,
credit guarantees and venture capital to SME throughout Hungary. The Structural
Fund Program, and in particular its JEREMIE initiative, has had mixed results, spark-
ing a continent wide debate on the effectiveness and impact of EU development
efforts.
ECOP 2.1.1 and JEREMIE represent two very distinct and unique mechanisms to
promote SME growth. While ECOP 2.1.1 relied upon traditional one off grants dis-
tributed by the government, JEREMIE engages and leverages the financial sector, uti-
lizing EU grants to attract and raise private capital through co-financing require-
ments and provides a number of low cost financial instruments to SMEs. 
Given the size of both these programs, and the important role of SME in
Hungarian economic growth, it is crucial to investigate the effectiveness and impact
of the respective programs. Yet, despite the importance of these programs, very few
comprehensive policy evaluations of the Structural Funds are available to the pub-
lic, especially in English.
Early impact evaluations of the 2004–2006 programming periods fueled skepti-
cism among experts and recipients about the effectiveness of the structural fund
program. Two separate evaluations of the SME modernization program conducted
by KPMG and the Hungarian government found significant deadweight loss – SME
would have implemented nearly 70% of their investments even without EU funds
(Béres 2009).
On the other hand, many experts and recipients argue that on the whole, the
Structural Funds have boosted the Hungarian economy and its small businesses, par-
ticularly during the severe financial crisis that continues to ravage the country into
2010. The same business owners that criticize the EU tender process admit that EU
funds have contributed to their firms' technological development, boosted compet-
itiveness and improved sales. 
The EU has established a number of economic indicators to measure effective-
ness, both on the program and project level. The analysis of the State Audit Office
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1 ECOP 2.1.1. call for applications is available (in Hungarian) at the NDA's homepage www.nfu.hu
of Hungary and some other independent researchers, however, show that the
established system of indicators does not function properly, as it cannot reliably
measure the effectiveness and the results of the projects and programs. This weak-
ness and deficiency of the indication system makes clear the necessity of indepen-
dent, academic research, to measure the effectiveness of certain programs or pri-
orities.
To fully understand the dynamics of the Structural Funds, and the impact of
ECOP 2.1.1 and the JEREMIE program in particular, it is crucial to integrate robust
empirical work with detailed qualitative fieldwork. 
1.1. METHODOLOGY 
This paper aims to determine both the efficiency and impact of the EU Structural
Funds on Hungarian on SME growth and access to finance. 
In order to capture the firm level experience with the impact of the Structural
Funds program a survey was distributed to ECOP 2.1.1 recipients from 2004–2006.
Two separate surveys were conducted at different times, the first to examine the
efficiency of ECOP 2.1.1 and the other to measure the impact of EU-funds on SME
access to finance. 
Both surveys utilized the same set of 2889 SME recipients of EU funds from ECOP
2.1.1.2 The first survey randomly selected 1275 SME and was conducted by Sándor
Gyula Nagy and a team of Corvinus University professors during the spring of 2009,
the height of the Hungarian financial crisis. The second survey was distributed to
223 randomly selected recipients in the spring of 2010 by Christopher Maroshegyi.
The qualitative portion of this study was conducted with relative success, despite
the hesitancy of many SME to respond to both surveys. Lack of government cooper-
ation and a dearth of data, however, prevented a robust analysis establishing causa-
tion, or even correlation, between increased JEREMIE funds and loans extended to
SME in 2007. The ongoing financial crisis, which began the same year JEREMIE was
announced, paralyzes any effective aggregate level analysis. Instead, this study was
forced to rely on broad, aggregate level data and trend analysis.
Finally, this paper provides a set of recommendations to improve future SME pro-
grams and the effectiveness of JEREMIE.
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2 The target group of ECOP 2.1.1 is: micro, small and medium-size enterprises (co-ops, one-person com-
panies, corporations and so on) based in Hungary. The potential financial support ranged from a min-
imum 1 million HUF (~3800 EUR) and a maximum 25 million HUF (~95.000 EUR), depending on
whether the project included infrastructure building, expansion or renovation. The proportion of
financial support (related to the project's total cost) was between 35% and 50%, depending on the
region where the project was implemented. Eligible costs in the application were the acquisition of
technical equipments and appliances (including transport, training and installation), expansion or ren-
ovation of infrastructure, further acquisition of technical know-how and license, some kind of limited
cost of personal, non-refundable VAT and a Hungarian specialty: the non-refundable VAT charged on
that part of project which received financial support from the EU-funds because of the VAT scaling reg-
ulation of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance (till 2006).
2. SURVEY OF ECOP 2.1.1. RECIPIENTS  
Empirical data, particularly on the firm level, pertaining to the Structural Funds is
notoriously difficult to access in Hungary. Lack of data or the sheer lack of cooper-
ation on the part of the Hungarian government has impeded the efforts of acade-
mics and this researcher alike and poses the single great problem to independent
program evaluation in Hungary. Initially, then, we were forced to rely solely upon
public databases hosted by the National Development Agency and MAG Zrt. This
was later supplemented with data from the online database of the Justice Court of
Budapest and the Information Service of the Ministry of Justice. We found 2889
SMEs which won EU-money from the ECOP 2.1.1. application, from which we have
chosen 1275 on a random basis to contact. In addition, we included every winner
with more than one project. We contacted these SME through telephone, fax and/or
email, and asked them to participate in our research by filling out an online survey
anonymously. Thanks to these methods, we received 148 answers.
In terms of those who responded to the survey, companies from less developed
regions were far less willing to respond to the survey. The same tendency can be
seen in the case of micro-enterprises, who are less developed than their medium
and large company counterparts. Micro-enterprises are underrepresented in rela-
tion to their actual proportion of overall grant recipients. In the research, were nec-
essary, we filtered out the distortion of the answers with the method of statistical
weighting. So we can say that the results of the research on the target group are sta-
tistically relevant regarding the patterns of region of origin, size of the enterprise
and amount of money won.
Unfortunately, this study was unable to establish a control group to determine
what the ratio among the losers is, but it is still obvious, that the vast majority of the
SME have resorted to the service of an application writer or adviser and paid a con-
siderable fee for it (Table 1.).
Table 1. Did you utilize the service of a grant application consultant? If yes, how much did
you pay?
2.1. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT
25.68% of the respondents did not have any kind of difficulty during the project
implementation, while three-quarter of SME have experienced some kind of prob-
lem (and more than one: in average a recipient experienced 1.2 problems during
project implementation, see Table 2.).
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YES 91.22%
NO 8.78%
fee proportional to the amount won 5.57%
average fee in HUF 616,000
average fee in EUR ~2,200
Table 2. What kind of difficulties did you encounter during the project implementation?
The results clearly show that the biggest difficulty was preparing the project
progress reports, which requires high administrative efforts. The second biggest
problem was acquiring the collateral (bank guarantee) needed for the EU-money.
Among the other difficulties, inflexibility, excessive bureaucracy, slow administra-
tion, long delays of the intermediate body and their failure to maintain various dead-
lines were mentioned.
Nearly 30% of the winners could not implement their project according to the
originally planned timetable and budget. This could be regarded as a good result,
but taking into account that this ratio means more than 850 SME did not implement
their project according to original plans, this ratio is not so successful. Amongst the
others the continuous delays, bureaucracy and the special Hungarian VAT-reclaim
regulations were mentioned (see Table 3.).
Table 3. Were you able to implement the project with the originally planned
timetable and budget? If not, why?
Among the micro enterprises the number of projects experiencing the above men-
tioned problems was 25% higher than the average. In the less developed regions (as
North- and South-Plain, North-Hungary and South-Transdanubia) the final beneficia-
ries signalled 20% more difficulties, than the average. This show, that the smaller
companies and enterprises in less developed regions can handle the project man-
agement problems much harder.
13.51% of the respondents signalled that they couldn't use the entire amount of
money awarded for the project. The causes for that were: changing of exchange
rates, decline of prices of acquired equipments or modification of the project.
56% of the respondents indicated that they had some kind of transaction cost
related to the project which were not eligible to be covered different reasons. On
average 6,1% of the project cost had to be financed by the SME, above and beyond
the co-financing required. These costs were:
 Cost of administration and management 22.84%
 Non-refundable VAT 57.27%
 Cost of financing the project (e.g. cash-flow credit) 10.46%
 Others 9.43%
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Preparing the project progress reports 54.55%
Obeying the environmental standards 3.64%
Obeying the EU transparency standards 11.82%
Acquiring the collateral needed to receive the EU-funds 32.73%
Other 17.27%
Delay in the signing of the contract 67.44%
Slowness and difficulties of the construction and the procurement 27.91%
Slowness and difficulties of acquiring the collateral or the co-financing 11.63%
Others 11.63%
54% of the respondents signalled that the transfer of the EU-money did NOT follow
the operative legal regulations (by their opinion). The (presumptive) causes are: 
 Unjustified completion of documents 32.50%
 Delays caused by the bureaucratic system and mechanism
of EU-funds 41.25%
 Both together 22.50%
 Others 3.75%
2.2. THE RESULTS OF THE PROJECT
The results showed clearly, that the global and Hungarian market situation has wors-
ened for all SME, and the EU-money was the only factor, which has (on average)
increased its market position against all problems and transition costs. This is a bit
surprising but very important finding of this research, however we must note that
the answers were based on subjective business sentiments.
After statistically weighting the results we have got the following result: 41.28%
of the final beneficiary SME were unsatisfied, and think it was not worth winning
and implementing the project, 90% of these respondents do not want to apply to any
EU-funds in the future. The other 58.72% of the SME were satisfied, but nearly 50%
of them do not want to go through the same bureaucratic and administrative mea-
sures to win and implement another EU-project, and are not planning to apply in the
foreseeable future. 
It is interesting again to highlight the regional differences in the results. SMEs in
Central- and Western-Transdanubia and in North-Hungary were more likely to think
it was worth applying, as compared to SME in Central Hungary. This result shows
that in less developed regions the enterprises regard the possibility of EU-funded
project more attractive than in the more developed Central Hungarian Region, even
if they have problems and difficulties with the financing and with the administra-
tive procedures. The companies in Central Hungary regard the EU-funds less help-
ful and can use it less perhaps because they are more developed and because of the
lower intensity of financial support (related to the project's total cost).
One third of the winners has applied (or was planning to apply) for new projects
since winning EU-money from the ECOP 2.1.1. The average time between the win-
ning and our survey was 4.5 years. The causes for applying again were: need for fur-
ther development or for maintaining jobs, while some signalled potential loss of
competitiveness in the event of not applying (because the competitors were apply-
ing for and winning EU-money). Among the motives for NOT applying are the usual:
high bureaucracy and administration, problems with co-financing and cash-flow
financing, and the falling demand for industrial goods caused by the recession. 
52.03% of the SMEs experienced some kind of synergic effect due to the project,
for example purchasing new technology or any kind of new construction or reno-
vation works.
To the questions “In your opinion, is the direct influencing of decision makers
necessary to win a project?”, the answers are in accordance with Corruption
Perceptions Index of the Transparency International. The SME are rating the system
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as susceptible to influence, meaning “if one has connections to the decision makers,
he has a better chance to win”.
2.3. EXPERIENCES IN NEW HUNGARIAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN
For the 2007–2013 financial period of the EU a new development plan had to be
adopted following the EU regulations. The New Hungarian Development Plan
(NHDP) is much more complex and has much more funds available than the
2004–2006 period. The entire NDP 2004–2006 had about 3 billion EUR at disposal.
The NHDP has about 24 billion EUR, which is about 3 billion per year. It has an
Economic-development OP (EDOP), which in aims and means is quite similar to the
ECOP of the first NDP. In 2007, it introduced a new application, the EDOP 2.1.1.
which is (partly) the continuation of the former ECOP 2.1.1. SME application. 
This type of application is the called “automated” application, which requires
much less administration, its decision making is fast and mostly automated. How is
that possible? To win the application the SME simply has to prove that it followed
Hungarian law (paid taxes, employed legally, fulfilled the environmental regulations
and so on) for two years, that it has a project within the financial limits of the appli-
cation, and can account for distributed money with invoices on machines, equip-
ments and so on. The eligible costs are limited to minimize bureaucracy and speed
up pay-outs. The whole project evaluation system is quite detached so it keeps out
corruption. Next to the apparent advantages, however, there are some disadvan-
tages.
Together with two colleagues (Ms. Lenóra Répássy and Mr. Gábor Somody) we
carried out a research based on interviews with application writers and advisers,
with EU departments of commercial banks and with final beneficiaries of new
EDOP 2.1.1. to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of this new application sys-
tem, and to see whether the identified problems of the ECOP 2.1.1. of the first NDP
were corrected.
Strengths:
 Simplified application procedure: the necessary paperwork can be done in two
days. The biggest “challenge” is to acquire a precise price quotation for the
equipments, which would be purchased in the project.
 Fast decision-making: the average time needed need to complete a project pro-
posal and receive a decision is 3–4 weeks, making it the fastest application pro-
cedure in the whole system.
 Decreased bureaucracy and administration during management: the so-called
project progress reports have been simplified, the indicator system is clear and
can be fulfilled with reasonable efforts.
 E-application: from the handing in of the project proposal, through the project
development reports till the financial monitoring everything is handled online. 
Weaknesses:
 Unnecessary data-requirements remained: there are still some kind of data
required during the project implementation period, which is regarded as
unnecessary by our interviewees. For example paper used for copying, amount
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of used water or electricity. Despite this, the data-requirements and administra-
tion are on a low, acceptable level.
 Real economic development effects are questionable: following the opinion of
some experts the real economic effect of this application system has not been
proved yet. Some said it is politically motivated to focus on rapid spending of
EU-funds, which can be well communicated.
 Possibilities for evading contracted obligations: there are existing possibilities
for evading the contracted obligations by the winners. Without giving ideas,
one can identify two main ways of cheating:
 manipulating the indicators (using legal or mostly legal ways)
 targeted (sometime organized) theft of EU-funds (exploiting the eased con-
ditions with a through of criminal acts)
These anomalies highlight the dilemma of the application system. Should the system
regard all SME as potential criminals, and therefore the whole system should be over
bureaucratized in order to avoid possible fraud, but also harden the life of “normal”
enterprises OR should the system focus to ease the life of the SME and with it the
life of potential criminals? The answers will diverge in different member states of
the EU. In Hungary the system is making steps to the second version after failing in
the first one.
3. JEREMIE IMPACT EVALUATION 
Empirical data, particularly on the firm level, pertaining to the Structural Funds and
JEREMIE is notoriously difficult to access in Hungary. Lack of data or the sheer lack
of cooperation on the part of the Hungarian government has impeded the efforts of
academics and poses the single great problem to independent program evaluation
in Hungary. 
As per EU stipulations, all recipients of EU-funds in Hungary have been listed on
the NDA's vast and often incomprehensible website. All relevant data is provided in
Hungarian only – preventing English speaking researchers from outside of Hungary
from conducting any review of the program. The NDA provides a number of quite
powerful public databases on their website, include EUTER, a database which
details implemented projects and project amounts on an interactive map of
Hungary. Another powerful database allows a user to review the recipients of each
Operative Program and Priority axis in any of Hungary's 7 regions. To our dismay
however, EDOP 4.1 – 4.3 was not included in the database, and no public records of
the final beneficiaries of the JEREMIE funds are provided on the site. 
3.1. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION RESULTS 
This project has thus been forced to rely on a broad trend analysis examining the
effect of JEREMIE's announcement in 2007 and the level of total and SME loans
extended. This broad analysis reveals upward trending levels of loans extended which
was sustained through 2007 and 2008 despite the impact of the financial crisis on
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monetary institutions. This may indicate that announcement of JEREMIE – and the
promise of a massive influx of funds in the near future – provided confidence for
financial institutions to continue their lending levels despite increased risks. 
Table 4. JEREMIE Timeline
*Start up capital originally allocated. Private and national contributions led to higher actual allocation
when the separate programs were announced.
Table 5. JEREMIE Timeline (EDOP 4.1. Call to Tenders)
Upon review, it is apparent that aggregate loans extended to SME peaked in 2008; the
first year JEREMIE began distributing funds (see figures 1 and 2). This may in fact be
traced back to the announcement of the JEREMIE fund and its various programs
throughout 2007–2008, which totaled well over HUF 200 billion. Anticipating the
quick distribution of loans, and especially portfolio guarantees, financial institutions
may have been more willing to extend their current stock of capital to SME. The actu-
al distribution of allocated funds has been painstakingly slow, however, and in the Q2
2009, only 9% of funds allocated for micro and SME loans were extended. 
Overextended from years of blistering growth in aggregate loans to SME, faced
with rising defaults and skeptical over JEREMIE delays, financial institutions signifi-
cantly cut back on loans to SME in 2009. It is noticeable, however, that loans extend-
ed to SME fell at half the rate than for total non-financial corporations in 2009, indi-
cating that JEREMIE funds may have dampened the effect of the crisis for SME. 
While the impact of JEREMIE may not be reflected on the aggregate level, one
industry expert believes its positive impacts on the financial markets can nonethe-
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Event Time Allocation,2007–2013 (HUF Bn)
Actual Dis-
bursement, as of
May 2009 (HUF Bn)
Venture Finance Hungary (MVZrt) is
established August 2007 200* –
First Call for Micro Loan Tenders
October 2007
57 6.4
First call for Loan Portfolio Gaurantees 27 .924
1st micro-loan distributed January 2008 – –
Launch of SME Program November 2008 50 .654
Notification of Venture Capital
Program December 2008 35 0
Launch of SME Working Capital
Program January 2009 140 .147
Tender Name Date Opened Date Closed Amount(HUF bn)
GOP-2007-4.1/A Micro Loan Program Oct. 15, 2007 Oct. 16, 2009 40
GOP-2007-4.1/B Micro Loan Program Nov. 7, 2007 Oct. 16, 2009 40
GOP-2007-4.2 Portfolio Guarantee Nov. 7, 2007 Oct. 16, 2009 60
GOP-2008-4.1/C New Hungary SME Loan Program Nov. 18, 2008 Oct. 16, 2009 25
GOP-2009-4.1 New Hungary SME Working Loan Program Jan. 1, 2009 Dec. 31, 2009 43
GOP-2009-4.3 Feb. 23, 2009 April 6, 2009 30.5
GOP-2009-4.3/2 New Hungary Venture Capital Program Aug. 28 2009 Aug. 28, 2009 36.5
less be seen as early as 2007. Dr. Jozsef Berecz, Managing Director of DBH Group
investment – a recipient of HUF 3.5 billion in JEREMIE venture capital funds – noted
that many financial institutions began supporting start-ups in 2007 to prepare for
upcoming JEREMIE tenders. In one project, two firms, Inostart and Valdeal, raised
HUF 500 million in public and private equity to provide technological and financial
support for start-ups with the hope of preparing them for JEREMIE funds in the
future.3
Figure 1. SME Access to Loans
Figure 2. Aggregate Loans Extended
To Berecz, however, most of the positive impacts of JEREMIE will only be seen
after 2013. Berecz considers JEREMIE a 'bell-weather' initiative, and believes that if
the program succeeds, it will change the culture of financial institutions in Hungary.
Were JEREMIE to succeed in extending affordable credit to SMEs while still afford-
ing financial institutions a healthy profit, banks will see a positive track record and
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3 Indeed, the purpose of the following chapter is to empirically test these claims and establish a correla-
tional link between the announcement of JEREMIE and an increased volume of loans to SME. 
begin to expand their SME operations. Firms like DBH have a proven track record
both abroad and in Hungary, and Berecz predicts that the same profitability and suc-
cess will be translated to JEREMIE's venture capital funds.  
4. FILLING IN THE DATA GAPS
Current data is inconclusive on the impact of JEREMIE funds on SME access to
finance. To fill in the data gaps and gain a deeper insight into the program's impact
on the firm level, it is necessary to turn to qualitative data. This project employed a
two-pronged approach in collecting qualitative data to isolate individual firms' and
actors' experience with the Structural Funds and JEREMIE. First, a survey of SME
receiving EU funds was conducted to establish baseline firm-level financial statis-
tics, financial constraints and finally the impact of EU-funded projects. Second, we
conducted dozens of interviews with policy makers, members of civil society and
academia to gain an insight into the problems of Structural Fund implementation. 
It is important to note that survey respondents are not recipients of JEREMIE
funds but rather the EDOP 2.1.1 program.4 The financial survey was distributed to
the same as the efficiency survey, a year later, in March, 2010. 
4.1. FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS
A great majority, 81%, of SME indicated that they had implemented projects aimed
at business development since 2007. Nearly three-quarters of SME relied on either
EU-funds or other state subsidized loans, such as JEREMIE, to finance their projects.
Most SME utilized more than one source of finance to implement their projects.
Nearly a third of SME that claimed they had used EU funds to expand their business
also utilized bank loans to carry out their project. This reflects that banks are often
unwilling to finance an entire project at terms acceptable to the SME, forcing busi-
ness owners to look elsewhere to for credit. 
Figure 3. How were your business development projects financed?
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4 The EDOP 2.1.1. application is available (in Hungarian) at the NDA's homepage, www.nfu.hu. EDOP
2.1.1. falls under the technological development priority access of the EDOP, with the express intent of
providing funding to modernize SME' technological, infrastructural and innovation capacity.
The most striking aspect of Hungarian SME' financial situation is their over-
whelming dependency on external financing for day-to-day operations. Nearly
three-quarters of SME indicated that external financing is important or very impor-
tant simply to maintain their operations. This is a worrying phenomenon that likely
reflects the negative impact of the continuing financial crisis, which has eroded
sales and assets for many firms. Most importantly, this highlights the critical impor-
tance of adequate supplies of credit for Hungarian SME. 
Figure 4. How necessary is external finance to the day-to-day operations of your firm?
Strikingly, nearly half, 48%, of SME noted that they experienced difficulties in
accessing finance. A number of factors were attributed to their firms' financial con-
straints, with high financial transaction costs and interest rates most likely cited to
be had effected or severely effected firms' access to finance. Half of SME complained
that high loan financing costs were negatively affecting their company. Other con-
straints cited were high bank collateral costs, loan servicing costs and the lack of
willingness on the part of banks to lend to SME. 
One firm indicated that interest rate costs eat up 15% of their assets and prevents
the firm from pursuing further expansion. So high are the costs of borrowing, the
firm indicated that interest rate costs were preventing them from hiring two extra
employees which would allow the firm to boost sales and productivity. A number of
firms expressed concern that the high financing costs would soon bankrupt their
business. One had already been forced to lay off 15 employees and is still on the
brink of bankruptcy. Another noted that financing costs were siphoning off most of
their internal funds, “with no end in sight.”
4.2. SME EXPERIENCES WITH STRUCTURAL FUNDS
Business owners were asked to rate the effect of commonly expressed problems on
their own company. These included co-financing requirements, loan collateral
requirements, costs of financing projects prior to receiving EU funds, and adminis-
trative costs. 75% of respondents stated that securing sufficient co-financing costs
was a major impediment in project implementation. Another 54% found it difficult
to cover the costs of financing the project. These results clearly show that financing
constraints are negatively impacting firms' ability to implement projects. 
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More alarmingly, the results of the survey reveal that the EU funds have had little
effect on firms’ access to finance. Less than a quarter of respondents indicated that
access to finance has improved, and not one believed that access to finance has
greatly improved after the allocation HUF 4 trillion to projects since 2007. 
Figure 5. How has your firm's access to finance changed since completion of your EU-
funded project?
The EU funds have had significant impact on SME sales however, with 88% of
firms reporting stronger sales thanks to the Structural Funds. This is significant
given the negative impact of the latest crisis among firms who have not received EU
funds. In fact, a recent Flash Eurobarometer revealed that falling demand and sales
have been the biggest concerns for Hungarian SME. Improved sales figures to have
medium to long-term positive impact on firms’ access to finance, as banks will
become more willing to lend to SME with stronger sales. In fact, a number of experts
interviewed in the financial field have noted that implementing EU-funded projects
establishes a positive track record, improves transparency and establishes a credit
history, all crucial for SME to access finance to reluctant banks.  
4.3 MAIN FINDINGS OF THE SME SURVEY AND INTERVIEWS
The survey reveals a clear need to improve the financial system at the local level for
Hungarian SME. Despite increasing levels of funds available for SME lending, the
money simply is not reaching those in need. High transaction costs and interest
rates – rather than a lack of available funds at financial institutions – constitute SME'
largest financial constraints. 
SME owners count EU-funds as a mixed blessing. Nearly every SME experienced
difficulties in obtaining the EU-funds and successfully implementing the projects. In
their follow up notes many have expressed frustration with delays in fund distribu-
tion and the red-tape that slows down implementation. SME may receive funding to
buy a certain type of computer in 2008, but by the time they receive the funds in
2009, that machine will have been obsolete. Co-financing requirements have put
many SME between a rock and a hard place, forcing them to take out high interest
loans without guarantee that the EU will release all of the funds for the project in
the end. 
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On the other hand, EU-funded projects have clearly increased firm sales. Most
SME have applied for funding more than once, and some even more. Most business
owners recognize the potential of EU funds, and many offer only small points of
reform. EU-funds have had a strong effect on sales, which is confirmed by the results
of the initial survey that show that EU funds have been instrumental in keeping SME
afloat during the latest financial crisis. 
5. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Interviews conducted with policy officials throughout the year reveal a com-
plex, bureaucratic, non-transparent and top-heavy institutional framework,
although survey respondents reveal some improvements in the program's
administrative burdens.
 The monitoring system for both ECOP 2.1.1. and JEREMIE is insufficient and
non-transparent. Monitoring indicators fail to show the real effects of EU-funds
on micro-level.
 Loans extended to SME significantly trended upwards from 2003 to 2009. The
impact of the financial crisis reversed this trend in 2009, but a deeper decline
may have been prevented by JEREMIE funds.  
 Financial constraints continue to persist and hamper SME operations in
Hungary, despite the growth in lending since 2003. Less than a quarter of
respondents believe that access to finance has improved since they completed
their EU-funded projects and nearly half of expressed difficulties in obtaining
financing. 
 More than 75% of SME experienced difficulties in implementing their EU-fund-
ed project, while nearly a third of projects were delayed or over budget. 
 EU-funds were cited as the only factor, which has, on average, improved the
market position of Hungarian SME during the recent financial crisis. 
5.1. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PROGRAM LEVEL
1. The Hungarian Government should strengthen laws to ensure dissemination
of program data. Contracts with private consulting firms should be
announced and the results made public.
2. Increase JEREMIE transparency at the financial intermediary level. Streamline
distribution to intermediaries and reduce auditing burden.
3. The pre-financing of any privately owned enterprises without bank guarantee
or collateral should be revised, possibly withdrawn. 
4. New monitoring methods should be introduced with the aim of further eas-
ing the administrative burden of the SMEs.
5. Vigorous academic research should be carried out to examine and analyze the
real economic effect of the “automated” application systems. Establish an
Institute for Structural Fund Evaluation that centralizes and coordinates
research efforts. 
126 KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2010/3  SPECIAL ISSUE
5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROJECT LEVEL
1. Partial rebuilding of the institutional system handling the EU-funds (from
managing authorities inside the National Development Agency to several
intermediate bodies), with the purpose of “best practice” implementation.
2. Rethinking the priorities and the means for economic development (includ-
ing JEREMIE, pre-financing – without collateral or other guaranties).
3. Strengthening the monitoring system (new methods, better cooperation and
data transfer between authorities).
4. Fighting political and “private” corruption in institutional system handling
the EU-funds.
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